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Abstract
In public goods games, group members share the benefits created through
individual investments. If benefits are shared equally, individual contribu-
tions readily become altruistic, and hence, a social dilemma arises in
which group interests and individual interests oppose each other. How-
ever, contributions to public goods can be self-serving if each investor
gains a disproportionate benefit from its own contribution. This scenario
may hold for our study system, the interactions of shoaling-unrelated
scalefin anthias Pseudanthias squamipinnis and the ectoparasitic blenny Pla-
giotremus tapeinosoma. The blenny bites off pieces of skin, mucus and scales
from anthias that in return may chase the blenny. Chasing the blenny
represents a public good as it makes the parasite change victim species for
its next attack. Laboratory experiments using artificial Plexiglas hosts sug-
gest that one reason why individuals contribute to the public good is that
the blenny may specialise on non-punishing ‘free-riders’. Here, we inves-
tigated how far a spatial structure within the shoal and limited space use
by the blenny may contribute to punishment being self-serving. Field
observation reveals that anthias indeed live in spatially structured groups
and that blennies have preferred areas for attacks. Thus, some anthias
individuals are consistently more exposed to blennies than others and
hence may gain disproportional benefits from their punishment. In con-
clusion, spatial structure may contribute to the maintenance of punish-
ment in blenny–anthias interactions even when groups are large.
Introduction
Relatively little empirical evidence exists to explain
how individuals gain direct fitness benefits from
mutual helping in N-player interactions. The critical
difference to two-player interactions, which have
been studied in much more detail (Sachs et al. 2004;
Bshary & Bergmu¨ller 2008; Leimar & Hammerstein
2010; Bshary & Bronstein 2011), is that helping can-
not be directed specifically to cooperative partners,
which may provide ample opportunity for cheating or
free-riding. The most commonly used approach to
describe an N-player interaction is that individuals
may contribute to a common pool, and the resulting
public good is then shared equally among all group
members, irrespective of the amount each member
has contributed. The standard payoff matrix used in
cooperation games on humans is equivalent to an N-
player prisoner’s dilemma (Fehr & Ga¨chter 2002; Mil-
inski et al. 2002), which, as the cooperator does not
get any direct benefit from its cooperative act, allows
cooperative solutions only under quite specific scenar-
ios that involve kin selection (Lehmann et al. 2007;
West et al. 2007b), cultural group selection (Boyd
et al. 2003) or reputational games (Nowak & Sigmund
1998) that yield benefits in other circumstances.
Alternative frameworks have recently been devel-
oped that explain stable contributions to public
goods. Archetti (2009a,b) and Archetti & Scheuring
(2011) showed that as long as the relationship
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between N contributors and the size of the public
good is nonlinear, that is, either a sigmoid or step
function, cooperators and free-riders will coexist in a
negative frequency-dependent equilibrium. The stan-
dard game that captures such a relationship is the
volunteer’s dilemma (Diekmann 1985). The logic
applies well to punishment of free-riders to stabilise
cooperation (Raihani & Bshary 2011; Raihani et al.
2012). Alternatively, stable cooperation may arise if
individuals benefit disproportionally from their own
contributions (Sherratt et al. 2009). Sherratt et al.
(2009) argued that their scenario fits well to public
goods scenarios where production and resulting ben-
efits are linked to a spatial structure. For example,
the production of extracellular digestive enzymes in
bacteria (West et al. 2007a) or cooperative prey cap-
ture in social spiders (Schneider & Bilde 2008)
mainly benefits the producer and nearby individuals
rather than the entire group. Thus, contributions
may become largely self-serving, as proposed by
the concepts of by-product mutualism (Brown 1983)
and pseudo-reciprocity (Connor 1986), which can be
applied to both two-player and N-player games
(Bshary 2010).
Empirical cases of public goods where benefits of
contributions are potentially frequency dependent
are potentially plentiful (Archetti 2009a,b) but typi-
cally not studied well enough to infer payoffs. In par-
ticular, separating direct fitness benefits from kin
selection benefits is often impossible if individuals are
related, which is the case for most social species.
Apart from humans, coral reef fish appear to yield
ample opportunity to study direct fitness benefits of
cooperation. This is because most species are open-
water spawners and the larvae are randomly mixed
during their pelagic phase (but see Shapiro 1983).
Thus, individuals may often interact with non-relatives.
An example of such interactions is the emergence of
a public good in interactions between shoaling fish
species and ectoparasitic blennies of the genus Plagio-
tremus (Bshary & Bshary 2010a,b). The fangblennies
Plagiotremus tapeinosoma and Plagiotremus rhinorhyn-
chos bite off pieces of skin, mucus or scales from their
victims (Moland & Jones 2004). Mucus has numer-
ous functions including protection against UV light
(Eckes et al. 2008) or bacteria (Subramanian et al.
2008), ionic and osmotic regulation, or locomotion
(Shephard 1994). But its calorific value and protein
content (Arnal & Morand 2001) also make it a valu-
able food resource (just as scales, Nico & Morales
1994) for ectoparasitic blennies. It is therefore in the
victim’s interest to avoid being bitten too often, and
in response to bites, victims often chase the blenny
(Bshary & Bshary 2010a). Experiments demonstrate
that aggressive chasing of the blenny functions as
punishment sensu Clutton-Brock & Parker (1995) as it
reduces the probability of future attacks (Bshary &
Bshary 2010a,b). However, for species living in
shoals, a public good arises as punishment increases
the probability that a blenny will switch to a different
victim species for its next attack (Bshary & Bshary
2010a,b).
Individual recognition has been demonstrated in
fishes in an interspecific context (Tebbich et al.
2002), and blennies are also able to discriminate
between punishers and look-alike non-punishers and
specifically target the latter in experiments using Plex-
iglas plates (Bshary & Bshary 2010a,b). Thus, it seems
that the parasite selects against free-riding by
non-punishing members of the shoal. However, the
experiments by Bshary & Bshary (2010b) only
demonstrated that blennies distinguish between two
look-alikes, while shoals may contain 100 or more
individuals, making the task of individual recognition
much more challenging for a blenny. According to
the model by Sherratt et al. (2009), a spatial dimen-
sion of the payoff function of punishment, yielding
larger benefits near the event and smaller further
away, would help to stabilise the self-serving function
of punishment even in large groups and with imper-
fect recognition of victims by the blenny. Spatial
structure in the victim shoals could promote localised
benefits in two ways: first, if the parasite avoids sites
where it has been punished and second, if the parasite
has preferred sites for attack, the effective group size
is lower than the total group size. As a consequence,
individuals that are frequently potential victims may
gain from punishment (and may potentially be indi-
vidually recognised), while individuals roaming lar-
gely outside the parasite’s preferred attack areas may
not gain from punishment (and may potentially
remain anonymous).
A common victim of the blennies, the scalefin anth-
ias, Pseudanthias squamipinnis (Bshary & Bshary
2010a), lives in shoals of 30–200 individuals without
kin structure (Avise & Shapiro 1986), which excludes
any kin selection benefits arising from punishment.
Anthias are fish with small home ranges (Bshary
2001) and hence cannot escape a blenny by simply
leaving its territory. With 8.5–28.4 strikes on anthias
per hour (calculated on 17 and 11 h of observations,
respectively), one could wonder whether the blenny
can keep track of its past interactions (but see War-
burton 2003 and references therein). However, as
developed above, a punishing anthias would obtain a
disproportionately high direct benefit in comparison
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with other individuals (1) if a three-dimensional
structure exists in groups of anthias and (2) if the
blenny shows site fidelity. The combination of both
effects would contribute to explain stable contribu-
tions to a public good in the host–parasite system. We
present here evidence for spatial structure in anthias
shoals, as well as blenny site fidelity, and discuss
potential implications of these results.
Methods
Study Site
Data were collected at Ras Mohamed National Park,
Sinai, Egypt, between September and November
2008. The study site was at Mersa Bareika, a bay in
which incoming sand through wadis led to the forma-
tion of patch reefs that are separated from each other
by sand rather than to the formation of a continuous
reef.
The observations took place at five different reef
patches (1–5) inhabited by approximately 100–200
anthias. The patches covered a ground surface of 6–
16 m2 with a maximum height of <2 m (Table 1) and
were situated between four and 6 m depth. The dis-
tance between each patch ranged from 15 to more
than 1000 m, a distance presumed to be sufficient to
prevent any migration of anthias between patch reefs
(Popper & Fishelson 1973).
Study Species
The piano fangblenny Plagiotremus tapeinosoma (Blee-
ker, 1857), also named scale-eating or sabre-tooth
blenny, is up to 14 cm long and occurs in coral reefs
and lagoons of the tropical Indo-West and Central
Pacific. It is a lepidophagous (i.e. scale-eating) species.
It attacks its prey from behind to bite off pieces of skin,
mucus or scales, quickly retreats to safety and then
returns to an observation point to choose its next vic-
tim (Johnson & Hull 2006; Bshary & Bshary 2010a).
Normally, it stops its biting attempts as soon as its vic-
tim notices it (victim turns around and faces it; per-
sonal observation). Blennies have one hiding place,
generally a deserted tube of a tube worm (Lieske &
Myers 2004). Nearly all species (occasionally even
predatory species) living at a given reef patch reef or
visiting it are potential victims, but the blenny mainly
focuses on smaller individuals (Bshary & Bshary
2010a).
One of the victims is Pseudanthias squamipinnis
(Peters, 1855), the lyretail or scalefin anthias. It is a
protogynous, hermaphroditic, up-to-15-cm-long coral
reef fish living in the Indo-Pacific. It forms shoals with
on average eight adult females per male (Shapiro
1981). It feeds on zooplankton swimming against the
current in general between 0 and 7 m away from the
reef, depending on shoal size (Popper & Fishelson
1973). It is considered as a resident species, staying
within a relatively small, restricted area of the reef
(Bshary 2001).
3-D geospatial distribution analysis of anthias and
blennies
To study the 3-D spatial distribution of anthias, we
marked between 21 and 28 females at each reef patch
with visible implant elastomer (Northwest Marine
Technology, Inc: Visible Implant Elastomer Tag,
“VIE”). Each side of the fish could be marked at three
places (which could be combined) just below the dor-
sal fin: at the front (near the fish’s head, behind the
operculum), in the middle and at the back (near the
tail). Each fish was marked on only one side. Using
two different colours (white and blue), but without
combining them, we could create a maximum of 28
different combinations. Some additional individuals
were recognisable with natural marks (Table 1). The
same code identifying fishes was used for all patch
reefs. For marking, the fish were caught in a
1.5 9 2.0 m barrier net with a mesh size of 0.5 cm.
One diver caught a fish, placed it in a hand-net and
Table 1: Number of identified fishes (Nanthias: marked fishes + individuals recognisable with natural marks), dimensions of the patch reefs (Dpatch, in
metres) and the grids (Dgrid, number of cubes of 1 m
3), total observation time (Tobs, in hours) and number of samplings at each patch reef. For anthias
(Obsanthias), a single sampling lasted 5 min and was repeated every 15 min. During this period, the position of as many anthias as possible was
recorded. The position of the blenny (Obsblenny) was recorded every 5 min. Data on the blenny when it was in its hole (i.e. not feeding) are included
Patch reef Nanthias Dpatch Dgrid Tobs Obsanthias Obsblenny
1 21 + 1 2 9 3 9 2 6 9 5 9 3 14 63 49
2 21 2 9 3 9 2 6 9 6 9 2 13 57 12
3 28 + 3 4 9 4 9 2 6 9 7 9 3 29 132 247
4 25 + 2 4 9 3 9 2 6 9 5 9 3 18 76 165
5 21 3 9 2 9 2 6 9 5 9 4 16 60 155
3
transferred it immediately to the other diver who had
the elastomer injection needle ready. Fishes remained
in the net for the injection and were released immedi-
ately afterwards on their patch. The procedure lasted
approximately 60 s. The procedure is likely to cause
only minor harm to the fishes as they typically joined
the shoal and foraged again right away. The fishes
were not anaesthetised as this would have been a
major manipulation with small benefits (not feeling
the superficial injection), while the disadvantages
would have been manifold: just the time until uncon-
sciousness would have been longer than the marking
procedure time interval; the effect of the drug is con-
siderable; the waking up causes undesirable stress and
would in addition increase the risk of predation as
predators readily detect prey individuals that do not
swim in the standard way. Our methods were
approved by the Egyptian Environmental Affairs
Agency in Cairo.
To divide the water volume occupied by the main
body of fish, a rectangular grid of vertical ropes in a
distance of 1 m from each other was constructed
around the different patches (Shapiro 1986). These
ropes were attached directly to the rocky substrate or
to small dead coral blocks and were held vertically by
floats. The third dimension was indicated with adhe-
sive tape marks on the lines each metre above the
sandy bottom. Thus, the water volume was subdi-
vided into smaller cubic volumes (or cells) of 1 m3
(Fig. 1a), some of them being partially filled with
coral. Cells were identified with coordinates in three
dimensions and numbered from left to right and from
the lowest layer to the highest layer. Table 1 gives the
size of each patch reef and the number of grid cells.
Note that the number of cells for a patch reef was not
necessarily proportional to the size of the latter as this
number was dependent on the movements of the
fishes too. For instance, a fish swimming 2 m above a
patch reef of dimensions 2 9 3 9 2 m = 12 m3
(width, depth and height, respectively) would add
two complete layers of cells to the grid. The final
number of cells on this patch reef would be
2 9 3 9 4 = 24 cells.
Observations by scuba diving, standing up 2 m
away from the reef and moving around it, lasted
60 min per reef and per observation day. Data were
collected only when fishes were foraging. Every
15 min and for a period of 5 min, the position of as
many marked anthias as possible was recorded. The
position of the blenny was recorded every 5 min. A
given patch reef was never observed more than once
per day. Between 13 and 29 h was spent on each
patch reef (average: 18 h), leading to 57–132 sam-
plings of positions of anthias (average: 77.6) and 12–
247 samplings of positions of blennies (average:
116.3) (Table 1). Except for patch reef 4 where one
individual could not be found again, all marked indi-
viduals were observed at least once again. On average,
31.8% of the individuals marked with VIE were
observed during each sample of 5 min.
Data Analysis
A first analysis of the data on the spatial positions of
anthias revealed that many cells of the grid were
never visited by any anthias. Each of them visited on
average only 14 cells of 90–126 cells. Carrying out an
analysis including all cells (as in Fig. 1a) would have
greatly decreased the expected number of observa-
tions in each of them. Therefore, to test whether the
home ranges of anthias are consistently non-overlap-
ping, we divided each patch reef into four parts (along
the x- and y-axes, similar to cutting a cake into four
parts, Fig. 1b) of approximately the same number of
cells (see Fig. 3). Because each individual was
observed in a small percentage of all cells only, this
method is considered to be conservative. The number
of observations of each fish in each of the four parts
was then calculated. A Pearson’s chi-square test of
independence with 2000 Monte Carlo simulations
(Sokal & Rohlf 1995) was performed in R 2.14.0 (R
Development Core Team. 2011) to test for the differ-
ence in space use between individuals. Only individu-
als with at least 20 observations were included in the
analysis. For the blenny, we tested with a simple Pear-
son’s chi-square test whether it used heterogeneously
(not randomly) the cells (as in Fig. 1a) it visited at
least once, that is, whether it had at least one pre-
ferred cell among all cells it visited. We did not
include observations when the blenny was in its hid-
ing place to avoid overestimating the importance of
this position. Unfortunately, we could not use the
(a) (b)
Fig. 1: Graphical representation of how the patch reefs were divided
into cells of 1 m3 (a: for the observations of the blenny) or four areas (b:
for the observations of the anthias).
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blenny of patch reef 2, as the data were insufficient
(12 observations).
Results
Individual Anthias Do Not All Use Space in the Same
Way
Some individuals were observed more frequently
than others in a certain region of the reef patch than
in another (see Figs 2 and 3 for patch reef 3). The
home range of each individual is only partly overlap-
ping with the home range of its neighbours. On all
five studied patch reefs, the distribution of observa-
tions of individuals among the four parts into which
the patch reefs were subdivided was dependent on
the individual considered (Table 2). If we consider the
cells that were visited at least once by an individual,
on average only 39.7% (range 15.1–65.9%) of these
cells were visited by (were shared with) another
marked individual.
Anthias Tend to Stay at Their Initial Place or Return to
it After a Blenny Attack
Being bitten did not make anthias change their posi-
tion. For the two patch reefs where enough data could
be collected, we calculated the distance between the
cell where the attack occurred and the cell where the
anthias was 10 s after the attack. Females stayed/
returned after having chased the blenny at their initial
place in most of the cases at both patch reefs (patch
reef 3: 72.4%, N = 29; patch reef 5: 67.7%, N = 99).
Blennies Show Site Fidelity
Like anthias, blennies tend to stay in a limited area of
the reef, generally not far away from their hiding
place. All blennies but the one of patch reef 1 were
observed more frequently in some cells than others
(Pearson’s chi-square test, patch reef 1: v22 = 4.4,
p = 0.1; patch reef 3: v210 = 159.7, p < 0.001; patch
reef 4: v27 = 156.4, p < 0.001; patch reef 5: v
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Fig. 2: Use of the four areas (as in Fig. 1b) of patch reef 3 by the 16 indi-
viduals that were observed more than 20 times. Each bar represents
one individual, where the percentages of usage of each area are
depicted in different shades of grey, while each shade denotes the
same area for all individuals. Numbers at the top of each bar represent
sample sizes.
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Fig. 3: A case illustration: the space use of two anthias individuals (A
and B) in the two lowest layers that comprise patch reef 3. The third,
upper layer was omitted as only one observation was recorded there
(for individual A). Grey tones correspond to classes of number of obser-
vations. The zones delimited by thicker lines are the four parts used for
the analysis of space use by anthias (see Methods, Fig. 1b). Dashed grid
cells represent the home range of the blenny. The cell with thicker
dashed outer line is the cell where the blenny had its hiding place.
Table 2: Pearson’s chi-square test of independence (with 2000 Monte
Carlo simulations) for the distribution of observations of individual anth-
ias among the four parts into which the patch reefs were. Nind: number
of marked individuals observed at the patch reef; Nobs: total number of
observations
Patch reef Nind Nobs v
2 p
1 9 263 113.6 0.0005
2 15 433 257.8 0.0005
3 16 811 502.4 0.0005
4 12 433 183.3 0.0005
5 15 432 249.1 0.0005
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p < 0.001). Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of the
blenny at patch reef 3. At patch reef 1, 100% (N = 42;
patch reef 3: 93.2%, N = 146; patch reef 4: 100%,
N = 125; patch reef 5: 74.4%, N = 129) of all observa-
tions were in the cell in which the blenny’s hole was
located or in adjacent cells.
Discussion
Previous studies on interactions between sabre-tooth
blennies and their victim host species found that vic-
tim punishment against a cheater occurs even in
locally abundant species (Bshary & Bshary 2010a)
where punishment constitutes a public good (Bshary
& Bshary 2010a,b). Contributions to public goods are
instable in the standard public goods game (Olson
1965; Hardin 1968), which assumes anonymous
interactions without the possibility to sanction cheat-
ers and without communication. In humans, stable
contributions to public goods may be achieved via
institutionalised or peer punishment (Ostrom 1999;
Fehr & Ga¨chter 2002), via reputation (Milinski et al.
2002) that may be linked to partner choice (Rocken-
bach & Milinski 2011), and by allowing subjects to
communicate with each other (Ostrom 1999; Janssen
et al. 2010). These mechanisms will probably be
rarely found in other animals owing to cognitive limi-
tations (Brosnan et al. 2010). The aim of the current
study was to assess whether in the absence of internal
control mechanisms, a spatial structure may contrib-
ute to alter payoffs in a way that contributions to the
public good become self-serving.
We found that the space use is not the same among
marked anthias of a shoal. The analysis of the position
of anthias at the moment of the blennies’ attacks and
10 s after them shows that females very frequently
returned to the exact same place. Both findings sup-
port the hypothesis that anthias live in spatially struc-
tured shoals. Shoal structure has also been reported
for guppies. However, these studies focussed on near-
est neighbours and demonstrated that individuals
group according to size (Croft et al. 2003) and accord-
ing to personality type (Croft et al. 2009), without
testing whether individuals have preferred locations.
Finally, blennies also showed a site preference. Taken
together, these results suggest that individuals who
share their home range more closely with the blenny
are at higher risk of being attacked. Hence, anthias in
the blenny’s core area share the public good of pun-
ishment with fewer individuals than one would
expect if one simply counted all conspecifics, which
reduces effective group size and thus the risk that pun-
ishment turns into a tragedy of the commons. Instead,
individuals that are frequently in the vicinity of the
blenny may gain disproportional benefits from pun-
ishment, which could make the act self-serving
(Sherratt et al. 2009). On the other hand, individuals
that are rarely exposed to the blenny would gain little
from punishment as the blenny would likely move
away anyway. Thus, if victims can flexibly react to the
level of exposure to a blenny, one would predict that
with increasing group size, the variation between indi-
viduals in their propensity to punish would increase,
with an increasing number of individuals not punish-
ing. Bshary & Bshary (2010b) indeed observed a nega-
tive correlation between group size and overall
probability of punishment. However, it remains to be
tested whether this result is indeed attributable to an
increasing proportion of non-punishers with low
interaction frequencies with the blenny.
Why individuals close to a blenny do not try to
obtain a spot within the shoal further away with a
reduced likelihood of being attacked currently
remains unclear. On possibility could be that the
blenny prefers to remain close to the centre of the
shoal to reduce its predation risk (Hamilton 1971) and
that its main victims remain because of similar antip-
redation benefits.
Punishment may yield direct benefits in two possi-
ble ways. First, the blenny could recognise the indi-
vidual that punished and simply avoid it in future.
Second, if individual recognition is impaired but the
blenny can remember where it was chased (Rodrı´guez
et al. 2001; Broglio et al. 2003), it could focus its
attention elsewhere for its next attack. The latter sce-
nario would very likely yield a public good because a
shift in location is often linked to a change in micro-
habitat, which in turn increases the probability of
encountering alternative host species (Williams
1991). But even if the blenny remains in the area, a
public good may emerge if a blenny’s response to
being punished is similar to that proposed for predator
response to having captured armed or noxious prey,
namely that the predator avoids look-alikes for some
time (Huheey 1988). Both scenarios may occur
according to a study on interindividual variation in
blennies with respect to foraging strategies (A. Bshary
& R. Bshary, unpubl. data), which is visible in the
field data presented in Fig. 1 in Bshary & Bshary
(2010b). Some blennies seem to focus on particular
victim species while others do not, and some blennies
appear to focus on particular victims while others
appear to focus on particular locations (A. Bshary &
R. Bshary, unpubl. data).
In conclusion, the results complement previous
research on this host–parasite system (Bshary &
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Bshary 2010a,b; A. Bshary & R. Bshary, unpubl.
data) that focussed more on individual recognition
as a mechanism by which punishers may gain dis-
proportionate benefits from their acts. Spatial group
structure of victims combined with the parasite’s
preference for certain locations may reinforce the
self-serving nature of punishment in individuals that
are regularly exposed to the blenny. Overall, the
results on interactions between blennies and the vic-
tims support recent developments in modelling that
argue that the assumptions of the iterated N-player
prisoner’s dilemma framework may not often be met
in nature. Changes in the assumptions about the
relationship between N contributors and payoff func-
tion (Archetti 2009a,b; Archetti & Scheuring 2011;
Raihani & Bshary 2011) or the introduction of a spa-
tial structure (Sherratt et al. 2009) may readily
explain self-serving punishment and the emergence
of public goods.
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